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ABSTRACT 
Insulation of Small Open Economies in the Presence 
of External Disturbances Under 
Alternative Exchange Rate Systems 
by 
Hamid Reza Azad, Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah State University, 1988 
Major Professor: Terrence Glover 
Department: Economics 
This study analyzes the determination of the exchange 
rate system in a small economy when external real and 
monetary disturbances occur. Choice of exchange rate policy 
is investigated using a model assuming rational expectations 
and a loss function expressing the squared deviations of the 
small country output from desired output. The 
distingui shing feature of the analysis is the emphasis on 
real as well as monetary disturbances wh ich originate abroad 
but are a source of domestic output variation. the link 
between foreign monetar y and real disturbances and variance 
in output is traced using the thoretical model and the loss 
function assumed. 
The emp hasis of the analysis is on a three country (one 
small and two large) trading situation, whereby the small 
country trades with two major large country trading 
partners. It is assumed throughout that there is perfect 
commodity arbitrage between two large countries. The small 
viii 
countr y imports an intermedt"~te good from one of the large 
countries and exports a finished good. 
doesnot import goods for consumption . 
The small country 
there is perfect 
capital move men t betwe en two lar ge co un tries, but capital is 
immobile betwee n th e s mall and these two lar ge countries. 
The a n a l ys is indi cates that occur r ence of purely 
nominal shocks abroad are not transmitted to the small 
country under floating exchange rate system. The presence 
of real disturbances in large countries induce lower prices 
for the goods they produce , but the effect on the exchange 
rate is ambiguos. This study concludes that in general the 
adoption of a fle xible exchange rate system by a small 
country is p refer red and results in lower lo ss in mo st cases 
of external disturbance . 
94 p ages ) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study analyzes the determination of the exchange 
rate in a small open economy. The purpose is to investigate 
the choice of exchange rate (the domestic currency price of 
one unit of foreign currency) and its relationship to the 
insulative properties of exchange rate polic y for a small 
country when external real and monetary disturbanc es occur . 
Choice of exchange rate policy is investigated usin g a model 
assuming rational expectations and a loss function 
expressing the squared deviations of the small country 
output from desired output (the level of output when labor 
market is cleared). The distinguishing feature of the 
analysis is the emphasis on real as well as monetary 
disturbances which originate abroad but are a source of 
domestic output variation. The link between foreign 
monetary and real disturbances and variance in output is 
traced using the theoretical model and the loss function 
assumed. 
The main focus of the analysis is on exam'ining the 
international transmission of disturbances in a three-
country trading situation, whereby the small country (price -
taker, less-developed country) trades with two major large 
country trading partners. This emphasis is a departure from 
similar work by Flood (1979), Flood and Marion (1982), and 
Daniel (1981). Other trading arrangements and subsequent 
analysis of the impacts of alternative exchange rate regimes 
on small country insulation from external real and monetary 
disturbances for the two-country trading situation can be 
derived using this basic theory. 
It is assumed throughout that there is 
commodity arbitrage between two large countries. 
perfect 
A small 
co untry imports an intermediate good from one of the large 
countries and exports a finished good. The small country 
does not import goods for consumption . There is perfect 
capital movement between two large countries but capital is 
immobile between the small and these two large countries. 
The only financial asset in the market is money. The 
problem for the small country is to choose an exchange rate 
policy which minimizes domestic output variation assuming a 
trading regime in which trade is necessary to production and 
consumption. Modification of domestic output variation via 
alternative choice of exchange rate system constitutes a 
policy to fully or partially insulate aga inst disturb ances . 
This work, then, is an attempt to determine the 
conditions under which a small country is full y or partially 
insulated (if insulated at all) from foreign real and 
monetary disturbances . The policies from which the small 
countr y can derive some form of insulation include 
alte rnati ve fixed, and flexible exchange rate regimes . The 
cr iterion used to compare alternative exchange rate systems 
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is a loss function expressing the expected squared gap 
between actual and desired output in the small country. Th e 
impacts of alternative exchange rate regime are traced using 
the loss functio n. 
OBJECTIVES 
Since trade is usuall y between the small country and 
one or two major large country trading partners, the focus 
of the study is on a three -country trading model. In this 
model foreign generated monetary and real disturbances 
affect the level of output in a small country under floating 
and/or fixed exchange rates. A fixed, or pegged exchange 
rate, means the domestic country chooses a "par value" for 
its currency in terms of the foreign currency and the 
domestic central bank attempts to keep the exchange rate 
within a stated margin above and below that par va lue. 
Under a floating exchange rate system, the exchange rate is 
al lo wed to respond to market influences and thus to settle 
at whatever level it takes to equate the demand and supply 
of foreign exchange. Usuall y a flexible exchange rate (as 
opposed to a fixed link to an external standard) is used 
when the countries desire greater flexibility and choose 
"managed" f loati ng with various degree of intervention . The 
country may choose a rule for officially controlling the 
movement in the exchange rate according to objective 
indicators . The study first examines the internationa l 
transmission of disturbances in a three-country, rational 
expectations world. An appropriate criterion, the 
minimization of domestic output variance is assumed for 
choosi n g among different types of exchange rate regimes . 
Specifica lly, the objectives of the study are: 
1 . To review the histor y of the international monetary 
system, especial l y after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
and Smithsonian agreements . 
2. To build a theoretical framework which can be used 
to ana l yze the effects of alternative exchange rate regimes 
on insulation from foreign real and monetary disturbances. 
3. To examine the international transmission of 
economic disturbances under various exchange rate systems 
and to determine to what extent each type of exchange rate 
system insulates a small, open economy from these foreign 
generated disturbances . 
ORGANIZATION 
The plan of the study is as follows: Chapter II 
contains a historical background of the international 
monetary system and a discussion of related lit erature. 
Chapter III presents the th ree country-two good rational 
expectations model. The solution of the model for each 
exchange rate system and the transmission of foreign 
disturbances to the small country are theoreticall y derived 
and described. The insulation properties of the system are 
4 
a ls o compared. Chapter I V discusses the three country-three 
good trading ge nerali zatio n of the basic mod e l, and chapter 
V detail s the two countr y -two good model . Chapter VI 
contains con cluding remarks and suggestions for further 
research. 
Ex aminatio n of the disturbance transmission process 
derived from the theoretical model yields the general 
results that the small country cannot be full y insulated 
because monetary and real disturbances are transmitted via 
the price channel and the exchange rate. Briefly , the 
analysis shows that the effect of purely nominal 
disturbances under a flexible exchange rate system are full y 
offset through the change in the exchange rate. External 
monetary disturbances do impose losses on the small country 
under other regimes such as fixing domestic currency to the 
curre nc y of large country trading partners. In the presence 
of real disturbances , the flexible exchange rate regime 
appears to insulate the small countr y . more than other regime 
c hoices . 
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CHAPTER II 
BA CKGRO UND AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
BACKGROUND 
Political boundaries tend to separate markets. This 
can lead to price differences, which provid e an incentive 
for trade. Modern developments in transportation and 
communication have greatly increased the degree of economic 
interdependence among nations. 
national money and 
international currency 
because 
exists 
Each nation has its own 
no generally accepted 
in the modern world, 
international economic transactions must be financed through 
the respective national currencies. Th e use of national 
currencies for international transactions makes it necessary 
to convert money from one national currency into another. 
An exchange rate (the price of one currency in terms of 
another) is important because it connects the price systems 
of two countries, and the selection of any type of e xc hange 
rate r egime is viewed as a sequence of choices and 
considerations that affect a ll aspects of the economy. 
The international monetary system changes to coincide 
with the needs of the world. Before World War I, most of 
the leading industrial nations were on the gold standard 
that emerged in the latter part of the ninteenth century. 
Each country defined its currency in terms of gold, and its 
central bank was required by law to buy and sell gold 
without limit at a stated price. 
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With the outbreak of World War in 1914, the 
international gold standard ceased to function. After the 
war, European countries struggled with a legacy of inflation 
and political instability. Substantial divergence in 
economic circumstances had developed in several countries 
and prewar exchange rates could not easily be restored . The 
interwar period, especially the first few years after World 
War I ( 191 9-23) and the currency crisis at the depth of the 
Great Depression (1931-34), were chaotic times in exchange 
rate history when most countries went on and off the gold 
standard. 
The interwar experience brought delegates from 44 
members of the United Nations together at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, 
structure 
s ystem. 
Monetary 
in 1944 , to negotiate an agreement on the 
and operation of the international monetary 
They created two institutions: the International 
Fund ( IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development ( now called the World Bank). 
Each member nation agreed to specify a "par va lue" for its 
currency in terms of the U.S . dollar (or its equivalent in 
gold, i.e. 1 /3 5 of an ounce). A narrow band of fluctuation, 
± 1 percent, was perm itted under the agreements made at 
Bretton Woods . 
The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund provided the basis for the international monetary 
system that existed from 1945 to 1971. The fundamental flaw 
in the IMF system was that i t did not provide any mechanism 
for orderly growth in world monetary reserves. Such growth 
was needed as world production and trade expanded, but it 
could come only in gold or dollars. Gold mining contributed 
very little, therefore dollars had to main tain the reserves. 
The United States had begun to run a balance of payments 
deficit as early as 19 50 , and in the early 1950s the 
deficits were welcomed because they increased t h e world 
sup ply of foreign exchange reserves. The persistent U.S . 
deficit was the focus of intense discussion all through the 
1960s. The U.S. overall payments deficits continued and had 
to be financed b y increasing sales of U.S. foreign exchange 
reserves. Eventually the United States chose to change the 
rules, and on August 15, 1971, the U.S. terminated its 
commitment to buy and sell gold at the $35 per ounce rate 
and set the dollar afloat. 
After a four month period of intense negotiation and 
discussion, in December of 1971 a conference was held in 
Washington, D.C. , at which the Smithsonian Agreement was 
created. This agreement established a new set of exchange 
rates, termed ''c entral rat es" inst ead of ''par value," with a 
pe rmitt ed band of ±. 2 l/4 percent around the new central 
rates. Finally, depreciation of the dollar against other 
ma jor currencies and failure to restore confidence in the 
do llar caused industrial nations to let the ir currenc ies 
float more or l ess freely in the foreign exchange market . 
With the collapse of the Bretton Woods and Smithsonian 
agreements between 19 71 and 1 973, the system of fi xe d "par 
value " was abandoned. Several types of exchange 
arrangements emerged, and they were formally l egalized as 
possible choices in the second amendment of the Fund's 
Artic les of Agreement in April, 19781. Exchange rate policy 
was left open to choice. Major industrial countries tended 
to adopt systems of floating exchange rates, either singly 
or jointly wherein the exc h ange market takes care of the 
exchange rate. For less developed countries with inadequate 
developme nt of domestic financial markets, lack of 
integration with world markets, limi ted capital market, 
restriction on cap ital flow, and other features which 
differentiate them from developed countries, independent 
floating seemed either infeasible or undesirable . 
It was expected that flexible rates would lead to 
smooth working of the external adjustment process without 
the need for co n trols on trade and capital flows. It was 
also wide l y held that flexible rates would help to achieve 
stab l e growth. However, it was also expected that the new 
system would increase the un certainty associated with 
1 Of the 151 members of the IMF, on December 31, 
1986, 9 1 were pegging their currencies (31 to the U.S. 
dollar, 14 to the French Franc, 5 to other currencies, 10 to 
the SDR and 31 to other currency c omposi tes), 8 we re 
operating a joint float (cooperative arrangement among 
European community nations) , 19 were independently flo at i ng, 
21 were attempting a "managed" floating and 1 2 currencies 
we re otherwise determined (including Democratic Kampuc hea 
for which no current information is available). 
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international transactions and would therefore discourage 
both foreign trade and international investment. Developed 
co untries considered flexible exchange rate systems because 
of the benefits expected . Howeve r, limited capital markets, 
non-diversified economies , dependency of economic growth 
upon the foreign sector, and rudimentary finan cial markets, 
ruled out the system as a feasible choice. 
Pegging to a single major currency seems to be the 
option most favored by less-developed countries at this 
time. It reduces the fluctuations of the exchange rate 
between a less-developed country and a developed-countr y, 
seeming l y reducing uncertainties and facili tat ing trade 
between them . For the same reason, capital flow for 
investment from the developed-country and rest of the wor ld 
ma y increase . However, single-currency pegging invol ves 
potential disadvantages , such as increasing the need for 
reserves since movements in the pegge d exchange rate of the 
less-developed country will not reflect actual developments 
in its balance of payments . Fluctuations in the exchange 
rate are exogeneous and independent of government policy and 
may interfere with interna l policy objectives. 
An alternative approach , which attempts to retain the 
advantages of pegging while ostensibly minimizing the 
disadvantages, is the strategy of pegging to a basket of 
currencies. This strategy has been adopted by some 
developing countries. To avoid larg e fluctuations in their 
11 
exchange rates, an increasing number of developing countries 
have abandoned single-peg policies and have started 
experimenting with composite pegs. 
There are qua lifications to the var ious arguments about 
exc hange rate policies, and 
weigh the benefits against 
it is 
the 
not possible 
costs. The 
to clearly 
ratio of 
disadvantages to advantages depends upon the conditions of 
the country in question, and each case must be analyzed in 
terms of resource costs, institutional costs, instability 
costs, and political costs. In this study responses to 
various disturbances under different exch ange rate systems, 
as well as their insulative properties for a small country 
are discussed in order to delineate the alternative regimes 
which assist in economic stabilization . 
REVIEW OF LITERAT URE 
The relative advantages of fixed and flexible exchange 
rates have been debated at length in the literature. Since 
the early 1970s, severa l studies have focused on the 
problems that small open economies have in choosing their 
regimes. 
Lipschitz 
Black(l976), 
(1978), Branson 
Crockett and Nsouli (1977) 
and Katseli-Papaefstratiou (1981) 
ruled out the floating exchange rate regime as a feasible or 
realistic option. However , significant differences in the 
inflation rates in small countries emphasized to the 
impo rtant issue of monetary and fiscal policy independence 
12 
and the adoption of some form of flexible exchange rate 
regime. 
One of the most important aspects of the debate between 
fixed and flexible exchange rates centers on the relative 
stability of 
disturbances. 
in exchange 
the two systems in ' the face of random 
For a small country, increased fluctuations 
rates undermine the domestic currency and 
obstruct its monetary functions. Increasing uncertainty in 
the trade sector decreases foreign investment and affects 
economic growth and income . Therefore, the main factor to 
be co ns idered in choosing an exchange rate re gime is whether 
or not it provides insulation from such foreign 
disturbances. 
The forma l examination of the effects of exchange rate 
systems on insulation of open economies is not new. Several 
authors have examined the stabilizing features and 
insulative power of various exchange rate regimes. Mundell 
(1963), Turnovsky (1976), and Fischer (1977) are among the 
contributors. 
Turnovsky (1976) and Fischer (1977) examined the 
response of a small open economy subject to various random 
disturbances under both fixed and flexible exchange rate 
systems. Turnovsky assumed capital mobility and 
minimization of domestic output variance as an appropriate 
criterion for choosing between two types of exchange rate 
regimes. Fischer does not allow capital mobility and, 
13 
because output is fixed in his framework, he uses the 
minimization of domestic consumption variance as his 
criterion of choice. Turnovsky concludes that the relative 
stability of output depends crucially upon the source of 
random disturbance. In the short run, output will always be 
mo re stab le undJ'r flexible rates if the stochastic 
disturbances are either in foreign trade or in foreign 
output prices. By contrast* greater stability is achieved 
under a fixed rate system if the disturbances occur in the 
domestic monetary sector. Fluctuation in capital flows 
tends to favor fixed exchange rates, especially if the 
domestic monetary authorities are able to sterilize them. 
However, Fischer found that if disturbances are monetary, 
under floating rates price level changes absorb the shocks 
co mpletely , while the shocks are transmitted to consumption 
under fixed rates. If disturbances are real , floating 
prevents the transmission of shocks abroad and results in 
greater instability of consumption than would occur under 
fixed rates. If monetar y shocks produce real effects, the 
superiority of floating rates in the face of monetary shocks 
becomes less certain. 
Daniel (1981) examined economists' prediction that 
flexible exchange rates would reduce business fluctuations 
caused by monetary disturbances . She incorporated rational 
expectation into her model of a two commodity-two country 
world. She found that purely nominal shocks, whether 
14 
temporary or permanent, are not transmitted. Howe v er, when 
nominal di sturbances are accompanied by real d isturbances, 
the latter a r e transmitted. Monetary shocks, which increase 
foreig n prices, are transmitted only if they have real 
effects. Inflation itself i s not t ransmit ted, but the 
acco mp a n yi n g real effe cts are. 
Gray (1976) focused on the impacts of real monetary 
disturbances on pric e and output variatio n. He incorporated 
short term wage rigiditie s and uncertainty to his mo d el and 
investigated the role of indexation in dampening 
mac ro economic fluctuations. Hi s results show that the real 
secto r is insulated from the effects of monetary shocks in a 
fully-indexed economy. The rea l effects of real 
disturbances are more pronounced in an indexed economy than 
in a noninde xe d economy. In an economy subj ect to both real 
and mon etary disturbances, t h ere must exist a degree of 
ind ex ing between zero an d one which is in some sense 
optimal. 
Flanders an d He lpm ap (1978) considered exchange rate 
policy for an economy t h at is a price-taker for tradable 
goods in the presence of wage and nontradable price 
rigidity. They showed that a flexible exchange rate regime 
is always as good as or better than the fixed exchange rate 
st r ategy . 
flexible, 
When 
the two 
all 
regimes 
domestic prices (and wages) are 
produce identical results. In the 
case of downward rigidit y in domestic wages and in prices of 
1 5 
nontradables, exchange rate flexibility counters the 
rigidity in the domestic price of nontradables, thereb y 
maintaining equilibrium of relative price ratio and in the 
labor market. F l ood (1979) also showed that mobile capital 
provides an open channel for foreign real and nominal 
disturbances to influence a small country under flexible 
exchan ge rates. 
The choice of exchange rate systems is a very delicate 
dec is ion and depends upon specific parameter values. As 
Lipschitz (1979) concluded, optimal exchange rate polic y 
should depend on the transitory disturbances likely to be 
enco untered by t h e developing country. In this study 
attention is directed to an examination of the stabilizing 
features of a lternative exchange rate systems in a three 
country-tw o good rational expectations world. Other 
trading-regime cases are derived theoretically as additional 
alternatives wit h which a small open economy is faced . 
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CHAPTER III 
THE THREE COUNTRY-TWO GOOD MODEL 
The first model co nsi sts of three countr i es and two 
goods. Two of the three countries are assumed to be ''l a rg e'' 
in that each ca n affect its own as wel l as world prices. 
Thethird country is 11 Small" in the sense that it cannot 
affect world prices . There are two goods, one is assumed to 
be a finished good and the other is an intermed iate good. 
One of the large countries (country A) produces a finished 
good (good 
produces an 
1 ) and the 
intermediate 
other large country (country B) 
good (good 2). The small country 
imports good 2 from country B to produce good 1 and exports 
good 1 to countries A and B. The small country does not 
import good 1 from either of the large countries. The 
countries issue their own currencies which are not 
internationally tradable. Local currency is the onl y 
fina n cial asset in the model. It is assumed that the small 
country faces foreign real and monetary disturbances through 
the process of importing good 2 for the production of good 1. 
The following assumptions are also made: 
1. Expectations are assumed to be rational . 
2. Perfect capital mobility exists between the two 
large countries, but capital is immobile between the small 
country and the lar ge countries. 
3. Goods arbitrage is assumed to be perfect and all 
goods are traded, but the small country does not import good 1. 
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4. The model is assumed to be logarithmically linear in 
a ll variables except the interest rate. 
5. Each country's economy consists of two markets ,i.e . 
the goods market and the money market. No bonds or paper 
issues exist. 
THE MODEL 
Notation 
Lower case l etters denote logarithms of variables while 
Greek letters represent parameters and they are all assumed 
to be positive. Subscripts refer to the time dimension. 
y Small country-real output 
y* Count r y A-rea l output 
y** Co untr y B - re al output 
y Smal l country-normal (desired) real output 
y* Country A-normal (desired) re al output 
y** Coun tr y B-normal (desired) real output 
pls Price of good 1 in smal l country 
p2s Price of good 2 in sma ll country 
plA Price of good 1 in country A 
p 2A Price of good 2 in country A 
plB Price of good 1 in country B 
p2B Price of good 2 in country B 
sA Small country- currency price of country A-
currency 
Small country- currency price of countr y B-
currency 
gAB Country A-currency price of country B- currenc y 
m Small country-nominal stock of money balance 
m* Country A-nominal stock of mone y balance 
m* * Country B-nominal stock of mone y balance 
i Small country-interest rate 
i* Country A-interest rate 
i** Country B-interes t rate 
u 
* u 
u ** 
v 
v* 
v** 
Small country-stochastic disturbance in output 
supply with mean zero and finite variance 6u2 
Country A-stochastic disturbance in output supply 
with zero mean and finite variance 6u2 
Country B-stochastic disturbance in output suppl y 
with zero mean and finite variance 6u2 
Small country-stochastic disturbance in mone y 
market with zero mean and finite variance 6v2 
Country A-stochastic disturbance in money market 
with zero mean and finite variance 6v2 
Country B-stochastic disturbanc e in mone y market 
with zero mean and finite variance 6v2 
E Mathematical expectation operator 
t-jEPtls Expected value of pls at time t, conditional on 
c* 
information available at time t-j 
The cost-of-living index for co untr y A whi c h 
con tains prices of both goods, ( measured in 
1 8 
domestic currency), expressed in logarithms, 
c** The cost -of -living index for country B which 
co ntains pric es of both goods, ( mea sured in 
domestic currenc y) ,expressed in logarithms , 
e* , 1- e * Expenditure shares on each co mmodity for 
country A 
e** , 1- e** Expenditure shares on each commodity for 
count ry B 
Smal l Cou n try 
( 1) Yt -
S tB)-
( 2) Yt d 
-
( 3) me d 
Country A 
( 5) 
( 6) 
(7) 
( 8) 
( 9) 
1 
Yt + Yl (Pt ls 
E(Pt ls - Pt 2B 
" o+ " 1 (mt - Pc 
Pt - so + B1 Y t 
me-l*+ Vc* 
e * P t l A + < 1 -
-
El Pels) + Y2 ( ( Pc l s Pc 2 B 
Sc B ) ) + Ut (Goods suppl y) 
+ " 2 Yc (Goods demand) 
S2 E (Pc+llS PelS) 
(Money d emand) 
(Money supply) 
E 
(Goods supp ly ) 
" 2 *y c * 
(Goo ds demand ) 
(Money supp l y) 
8*) ( Pc2B + StAB ) 
(Co st-of-living Index) 
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Country B 
( 10) 
(Goods supply) 
( 11) 
(Goods demand) 
( 12) ** Cc ** - So** + a l**yc** - a ** ** fit 2 1t 
(Money demand) 
(13) ** ** + Vc ** (Mo ne y supply) me ffit-1 
(14) Cc ** e** Pc 2 B + ( 1 - e **) (Pc lA - ScAB) 
(Cost-of -living Index) 
Equation ( l) is the small country supply function. 
Current output, expressed in terms of its deviation from the 
normal level Y, is a function of domestic price predi ction 
error and relative price prediction errors, and uc is a 
stochastic disturbance term having zero mean and constant 
variance. The supply of good l is a positive function of 
the price of finished goods (PelS) and a negative function 
of input (i mport) price (Pc2B). Equations ( 1 ) and (2) are 
dependent on the underlying production function in the small 
country and have important implications for how effectively 
various exchange rate regimes insulate domestic output from 
unanticipated disturbances . 
Equation (2) represents the expenditure function for 
the small country which is assumed to depend positively on 
real money balances and domestic income. Equation (3) states 
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the demand for real money by residents of the domestic 
country and is assumed to be dependent on real output 
positively and expected inflation negatively. Equations (7) 
and (12) are demands for real balance by residents of the 
l a rge countries and are assumed to be dependent on real 
output positively and nominal interest rate negativel y. 
Equation (4) specifies the money supply process in the 
s 11a ll country. The small count ry supplies its own money 
wr.en it elects to adopt 
(f) and (13) represent 
ccuntry B respectively . 
flexible exchange 
the money supply 
rates. Equations 
for country A and 
Equations (9) and (14) define the 
ccst-of- living index which contains the prices of both goods 
ir: terms of domestic currency, wher e e *, (1- e )* and e**, (1-
e) ** are the expenditure shares on each good for country A 
ar.d country B respectively. 
Equation (5) represents the supply function of country 
A. Supply is a function of the cost-of-living prediction 
errors. the domestic real price prediction errors, and a 
stochastic disturbance term Equation (10) is 
similar. Equations (6) and (11) are expenditure functions 
fo r the large countries and are positively related to 
nati onal income and relative prices. 
Th e assumption of perfect capital mobility between the 
tw> large countries implies the following interest rate 
pa:ity relation. 
15 1 i* 
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Equation (15), states that the nominal interest rate in 
country A is equal to the nominal interest rate in co untry B 
plus the expected rate of depreciation of country B's 
curren cy relative to country A's currency. 
The following equations , (16) and (17) represent the 
pur c hasing power parity relation (law or one price ) and they 
state that the logarithm of domestic price is equa l to the 
logarithm of foreign price plus the logar ithm of the 
exchange rate between the two countries. 
16) 
17) 
THE LOSS FUNCTION 
The appropriate criterion to be used for comparing one 
exchange rate regime with another is the loss function L, 
wh ich is expressed in terms of deviations of the logarithm 
of actual output from t .he logarithm of normal (desired) 
level of output. 
(18) 
One of the assumptions of the rational expectations 
theory is that markets are always in equilibrium and 
econo mic agents set wages and p rices, given the information 
they have, so as to achieve maximum profit and utility. 
However, there are shocks and disturbances that cannot be 
predicted (imperfect information ) and cause disequilibrium 
and uncertainty in different sectors of the economy. 
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Disequilibrium and variation result in production 
inefficiency and distortion of output from desired output, 
causing loss to the society. 
Tobin (1958) and Samuelson (1983), assuming a general 
quadratic and concave utility function, discussed the effect 
of risk-and - return variation in portfolio selection. They 
conc luded that, assuming diminishing marginal utility, the 
gain in utility from using a specific amount of a thing is 
less than the loss of utility from not using the same thing. 
That is, the increase in the mean increases utility, but 
increases in the variance with preserved mean decreases the 
utility. Therefore , variation decreases utilit y (welfare) 
and is viewed as a loss to the society . Under the 
assumption that expectations are formed rationally, workers 
and producers make decisions using all available information 
which depends significantly on the future consequences of 
their decisions . People tend to avoid repeating pre v ious 
errors and the economic environment rewards those who make 
good forecasts and penalize those who make poor forecasts by 
using available information . Ther efore, it is the surprises 
in the economic environment which cause employment and 
production decisions to deviate from their optimum and bring 
about losses to society. 
The proposed criterion for selection of an exchange 
rate system is the minimization of the expected squared 
difference between actual output , Yt, and desired ou tp ut , 
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Yc. with L denoting loss. Desired output is defined as full 
information output , when al l markets including the labor 
market are cleared and the level of employment is derived 
from equilibrium in the labor market. 
In order to derive the loss function for the small 
country in the form specified by ( 18) , the supply funct ion 
(equation(!)) is used as 
Yc - Yt + Yl (Pels Ee-l Pels) + Yz ((Pels - Pc2B - scB) 
E (Pels - pt2B scB) l + ut 
By subtracting normal output, Y, from both sides, and 
squaring the expectation of both sides of the equation, . the 
following is obtained, 
E [(Yc - Yc)2] E Yl (Pels 
The result is that the left side of the above equation is 
the same as the right side of equation . (19). Therefore , the 
following relation results as representative of the loss 
function: 
(19) L - E [(Yc 
PROCEDURE 
The method of this study was to work through the 
following steps: 
1- Derive the loss functions for the small country under the 
following cases: 
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a- The small country fixes its exchange rate to countr y 
A's currency and floats against co untry B's currency; 
b- The small country fixes its exchange rate to countr y 
B's currency and floats against country A 
c- The small country adopts a flexible exchange rate 
system against both countries. 
2- Examine the effects of the transmission of various 
foreign generated disturbances on the loss function. 
3- Compare exchange rate regimes for the cases mentioned 
above , emphasizing their insulative properties . 
The following steps for the three cases have been 
developed. 
l.Case la: 
The small country fixes its exchange rate to country 
A's currency and floats against country B's currency. In 
order to derive the loss function in this case, equation 
(16) and (17) are used to derive: 
(20) OR 
When the small country chooses to fix its currency 
against country A, the domestic price becomes exogenous and 
is affected by random disturbances which affect the price 
level in country A. The exchange rate between the small 
country and country B is also exogenous and changes 
pr o portionally to the changes in exchange rat e between the 
currency of country A and the currency of country B. 
Equation (16) and (20) for this case are as follows: 
16') 
20 . ) 
pt1s _ pt1A + SeA 
StB - StAB + SeA 
2 6 
OR 
The domestic price solution and exchange rate solution can 
be derived from the above equations. The loss function, 
(19), depends on the domes tic price prediction error and the 
relative price prediction error . Using equation (16'), then 
(21) 
Where SeA is now fixed . So the domestic price prediction 
error is equal to the domestic errors in predicting the 
price of good 1 in country A. 
The relative price prediction error can be found 
through the following steps : 
Since 
Therefore, 
( 22) 
By substitut ing equations (21) and (22) into (19) the loss 
function for this case becomes, 
( 2 3) L - E 
Y2 ((Pc1A _ pt2B -StAB) _ E (PclA _ pt2B 
+ Ut ]2 
The above los s function is dependent on the domestic errors 
in predi c ting the price of good 1 in country A. The 
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relative price prediction error i s equal to th e erro r in 
predicting the price of good 1 in countr y A the pri ce of 
good 2 in country B, and the exchange rate be tween c ountrie s 
A and B . Random dis t urbances in the small country do not 
affect the l oss function . 
To find the fluctuations in the loss function, foreign 
price solutions and the exchange ra te solution need to be 
determined. Dete rmination of these values requires solving 
t h e model for current and expected prices , Pc 1 A , Pc2B and 
exchange rate, StAB _ The assumption that expectations are 
rational implies that they are formulated u si n g all 
available informati on . The method which is used to so lv e 
such a model is to postulate a so lu tion form for each of the 
endogenous variables 
mt-1 • * me -l ** me-l 
p lS 
t ' 
S AB 
t ' i, 
in terms of exogenous variables-
vt*· v ** t ** Ut The 
so lution for the endogenous variab les is lo g linear in the 
exogenous var iabl es . Solution of the mod e 1 requi r es 
determini n g values for each of the price solution (reduced 
form) coeff icients ( " s) of the exogenous variables, where 
the 1T ij are funct ions of structural parame ters. Taking 
advan tage of the model's linearit y in logarithm s in order to 
write foreign pric es, p lA t ' p 28 t ' and excha n ge rat e, S AB t ' 
as linea r function of the system's predetermined variab l es 
a nd disturbances , 
and stAB are, 
the reduced form equations for PclA, p 2B t 
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( 24) 
( 2 5) 
·p t 2 B - " 21 m t- l + 
n 24Vt + n 25Vt* + 
( 2 6) 
** 
In this case, the small country pegs its currency to 
the currency of country A· therefore SeA is fixed and Ee-l 
The domestic money market is not always cleared 
since the dome st ic pric e is exogenous . The domestic money 
supply becomes endogenous and is influenced b y the balance 
of payments . Because of the ''large'' country assumption, 
country A sets the world price of good l. The price of good 
l in the small countr y is set by country A and the loss 
function is not affected by ptlS_ Monetary and real 
disturbances in the small country do not ha ve any effect on 
domestic and foreign prices; therefore , 
Because the exchange rate between country A a nd countr y 
B is flexible, any monetary disturbance in either of the two 
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countries will be absorbed by the exchange rate and wi ll not 
be transmitted to the other. Because the price of good 1 is 
set by country A and the price of good 
B, the following results are derived, 
is set b y country 
7[ 13 
-
7[ 16 0 7[ 19 0 
7[22 7[ 25 
-
0 7[28 ? 0 
7[ 12 > 0 7[ 15 > 0 11 18 < 0 
7[ 23 > 0 7[ 26 > 0 7[ 29 < 0 
7[3 1 7[ 34 
-
7[ 37 0 
7[32 > 0 7[ 35 > 0 7[ 38 0 
7[ 33 < 0 7[ 36 < 0 7[ 39 0 
The rational expectation assumption is that the 
ex pectation of a variable is its expected value conditioned 
on available information and using this information 
efficiently. Since the mean of all random disturbanc es is 
zero, the expected value of all random shocks at is zero 
at time t -1. allowing the expected foreign prices and 
exchange rate to be expressed as: 
Et-1 Pt lA - 7[ llmt-l + 7[12mt-l * + 7[ 13mt-1 ** 
Et-1 Pt 2B 7[ 21mt-l + 7[ 22mt-1 * + 7[ 23mt-1 ** 
Et-1 St AB - 7[31mt-l + 7[ 32mt-1 * + 7[ 33mt - 1 ** 
The unexpected part of domestic and relative pri ce are 
( 2 7) ( Pt 1A + S tA) - E (Pt lA + stA) 
- Pt 1A E Pt 1A 
( 28) pt 1A E Pt 1A 
-
7[14 v t + n15v t * + n16 v t ** + 
7r l]Ut + 7r l8ut: * + 7r19Ut ** 
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( 2 9) (Pc lA Pc 2B - StAB) E ( p t lA Pc 2B ScAB) -
" 14 " 24 - " 34) Vc + ( " 15 " 25 "35)Vc * + 
TI 16-
"26 " 36)Vc ** +( " 17 "2 7 " 3 7) + uc 
" ls " 28 " 3 8) Ut * + ( " 19 " 29 " 3 9) ** uc 
Some of the coeffi c ients values and signs were found 
earlieF. These coefficients are restricted to be zero; 
Therefore the new expressions for domestic and relative 
price prediction error are, 
(30) Pc lA - E Pc lA 11 1 5Vc * + " 1suc * + " 1 9Ut ** 
(3 1) (Pc lA - Pc 2B StAB) E (Pc lA Pc 2B scAB) - ( 
rr 15- " 3 5) V t * + (- 11 2 6 " 36)Vc ** + " 18 11 2 8 
rr 3s) uc * + ( " 19 - " 29 "3 9) ** u c 
The above equations can be substituted into (23) to derive 
the loss function for case la, 
(32) Lla - E [ y 1 { ( 11 15Vt * + " 18Ut * + " 19 uc**)) + 
y 2 ( ( 
" 15 - 11 3 5) v t * + (- "2 6 " 36) V t ** + " 18 -
112 8 - " 3s)uc * + ( 11 1 9 - " 2 9 "39) uc**l + } 2 Ut 
2.Case lb: 
The small country fixes its exchange rate to country B' 
currency and floats against country A: Using equations (16) 
and (20) the following is obtained : 
(33 ) PelS - PclA - ScAB + ScB 
I n this case, ScB , the exchange rate between the small 
cou ntr y and country B is fixed. Equation (23) indi cates 
that, because Pc 1 A and ScAB are given, the domestic price is 
exoge nous. So the price level in the small country is 
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affected by di sturbances that affect the price level of good 
1 in country A and the exchange r ate between c ountr y A and 
co untry B . The ex c h ange rate between the small country and 
country A changes inversely with th e exchange rate betwee n 
c ountries A and B. 
The loss fun ction, equation ( 19). dep e nds on the 
domestic and relative price prediction errors. Using 
equat ion ( 3 3) . then , 
( 34) p lS t EPt lS (Pt lA St AB + stB) E (PtlA_ 
So the domestic price prediction error is equal to the 
domestic errors in predicting the price of good l in country 
A and the errors in predicting the exc hange rate between 
countr y A and country B . To find the relative price 
prediction error for this case, equation (23) is used and 
substituted for Ptls in the relative price to get, 
Therefore, the relative price prediction error is given b y 
( 3 5) stB) -E (PtlS - pt2B -stB) -
StAB) -E (PtlA - pt 2B - StAB) 
By substituting equations (34) and (35) into (19 ) the loss 
function for this case b eco mes, 
( 3 6) L 
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The loss function in th i s case is dependent on the domestic 
error s in predicting th e price of good 1 in c oun try A and 
the exc h a nge rate between cou n tr i es A and B. The relative 
price prediction error is equal to the error in pr e di cti ng 
t h e pric e of good 1 in country A and the pric e of good 2 in 
co untr y B , and the exchang e rate between countries A and B . 
The loss function is again unaffected by rand om dis t u rbances 
occuri n g in the small countr y . 
The foreign price and exchange rate solutions c an also 
be obtained. The solutions for PrlA 
ex pre ssed for case la . The expected value of ptlA p 2B t 
an d StAB are: 
Ee-l Pr lA Ti ll + n l2 * + nl3mt-l ** me-l me-l 
Er-1 Pr 2B TI 21 + " 22 * + " 23mr-l ** me-l me-l 
Er-1 Sr AB TI 31 me-l + " 32 me-l * + " 33mt-l ** 
The exchange rate betwe e n the small country and countr y 
B is fixed, SrB , therefore Er-1 SrB The unexpected 
pa rt of domestic price predi c tion is, 
( 3 7) (Pc lA St AB + scB) - E (Pr lA - St AB + scB) -
( p t lA StAB) E(Pr l A StAB) 
(3 8) (Pc lA StAB) E(Pr lA stAB) " 1 5 TI 3 5 )V * + t . 
( "16 TT 35) V t ** + ( TT 18 TT 3s)uc*+ " lg TT3g) uc *'' 
As for case la , the value for some of the coeffi cie nts are 
zero. Then, the domest ic and relati ve pri ce p rediction 
er rors become, respective l y, 
( 3 9) 
( 40 ) 
(P tlA - stAB ) 
(- " 36lVt**+ 
(-
p 2B 
t 
" 35lvt* + <- " 26 
" 29 " 39lut** 
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Substituting t he above exp r essions for domestic and relative 
price prediction errors into (36) enables the loss function 
to be derived for this case as, 
( 41) Llb E [ yl ( ( " 15 " 3 5) v t * + ( - 7f 36) v t ** + "18 
7f3 8) Ut * + (- "3g)ut**J + y2 ( ( " 1 5 " 35lVt * + (-
7f 2 6 - " 36)Vt ** + ( " 18 " 28 "3 8) u t * + ( " 19 
" 29 - 7f 3g) Ut ** ) + Ut l 2 
.Case lc: 
The small country adopts a flexib le exchange rate 
s y stem against both countries . If the small country ' s 
cu rr e nc y floats against countr y A and country B's 
currencies, any disequilibrium in the mone y market 
disappears. Price changes to guarantee money market 
c learin g . The balance of payments is in equilibrium , so 
there is no change in domestic money supply coming from 
c hanges in balance of payments. Using equations (16) and 
(2 0 ) , and substituting for ptls in relative price we get, 
( 4 2) p l s t 
p l A 
t 
ScB - ptlA + SeA - pt2B - ScB -
stAB 
Subsequ e ntl y, the rela t ive price prediction error be c omes; 
( 43) 
The loss function in this case becomes 
(44) L - E ( y l { ( Pels p 2B t 
3 4 
Under the flexible exchange rate regime domestic price 
is endogenous and the relative price of good 2 in terms of 
the domestic price of good l is exogenously determined. The 
domestic price pr ediction error is affected by real and 
monetary random disturbances occuring in the small country 
as well as in country A and country B. However, the 
domestic random disturbances do not affect the relative 
price. Th e relative price predict i on error depends on 
domestic errors in predicting ptlA 
The relative price prediction error in this case is the 
same as in cases la and lb. Using the small country money 
and goods market , the domestic price 
ex pre sse d as 
(45) 
TI5 4Vc+ nssVc* + ns6Vc** + TI S7Ut + 
n sgut** 
The expected value of domestic price, P ls t ' 
solution can be 
is , 
And the unexpected part of domesti c price becomes, 
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Because domestic pri ce is exogenous an d the price of good 
is se t by countr y A, domestic dis turbanc es do not have a n y 
ef f ect on p ls . t ' Therefo re 
If the sma ll country f loats its exchange rat e against 
the two large countries, monetary disturbances occur ing in 
country A or country B will not be transmitted. They a r e 
absorbed by the exchange rate; and rrs2 - rrs3 - rrss _rr56 - 0 
then relation (46) becomes , 
( 4 7) 
In order to derive the loss function for this case , the 
price prediction error, ( 4 7)' and the relati ve price 
prediction error , (40), are substituted in, (44), to get, 
(48) Llc - E [ Y 1( rr s8 ut* + rr 59 ut**l + Y2 (( rr lS 
rr 35)Vt* + (- rr 26 - rr 35)Vt** + ( Tr 18 - Tr 28 
Relations ( 2 3) ' (36) and (44) repres ent the l oss 
functions for cases l a, lb, and lc respectivel y. Th e loss 
functions depend on domestic price and relati ve price 
prediction errors. Th e domes tic and r e lati ve price 
prediction errors are obt a ined from domestic and foreign 
pric e solutions and good s arbitrage conditions. Solve the 
model for three types of exchange rate regimes and then 
substitute these price a nd exchange rate so luti ons into 
(24), (36), and (44), respecti vely relations (32), (41), and 
(48) a r e deriv e d. Th e l atte r show the loss functions in 
te rm s of monetary and re al disturbances. 
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TRANSMISSIO N OF FOREIGN DISTURBANCES 
The loss functions indicate that the prediction error 
depends on domestic errors in predicting ptlA 
S AB t . Random shocks to the stock of money (monet ar y 
disturbances) and supply of output ( real disturbances) in 
countries A and B have direct effects on the small country 
via the price channel and relative price direction. The 
s mall country cannot fully insula te itself from real and 
monetary disturbances in countries A and B under any type of 
e xchang e rate regime in a two good - three country model where 
t he small country is importing one good to p roduce a 
finished good which is exported to large countries . 
Mon etary Shock 
Unexpected monetar y expansion in country A or B 
depreciates it s currency rela tive - t o other country's 
currency (ScAB is higher or lower than expected) and causes 
t he price of good 1 (produced by coun try A) or the price of 
go od 2 ( produced b y c ount ry B) to excee d expected prices. A 
permanent unexpected monetary disturbance is unlikely to 
ca use exchange rate overshooting, bu t a tempo rary 
disturbance does c a use overs hooting . Ass umi ng a r ational 
exp ectation world in which people understand a policy and 
as sume it will b e long-lasting, there is no ove rshooti ng . 
Also, in a rational expectat i on world, following the 
purchasing power par ity theo ry, the change in PtlA is equal 
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to change in S AB t and when supply increases in countr y B , 
the change in pt2B is equal to change in StAB. With these 
assumptions as a base, different cases can be discussed. 
l . Money Supply Increases In Country A: If country 
A 's mon ey supply is larger than expecte d, then ptlA and ScAB 
increase more than anticipated. Higher PclA and ScAB lead 
to flu ctuations in domestic price and relative price. The 
effect of this change on the different loss functions is as 
fo ll ows: 
l.l Case la: The loss function relation (23) , for this 
case is: 
Higher Pc 1A ca uses the domestic price prediction error to 
increase, but the effect of higher S AB t on the 
re l ative price pred iction error, considering equal c h ange 
and opposite signs for Pc 1 A and ScAB, offset each other . The 
only effect of increased money supply in country A on the 
loss function is to increase in PclA which results in a 
higher domestic pri ce prediction error and an increase in 
the loss. 
l . 2.Case lb: Recall relation (36), 
L - E [ y l{ (PtlA - ScAB + ScB) - E (PtlA - ScAB + ScB) l + y 2 
Higher Pc 1 A and ScAB than expected affect both domestic and 
relative price prediction errors . An equal magnitude of 
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change and opposite sign of ptlA and stAB offset each effect 
and results in zero change in loss. 
l.3.Case lc: The following relation represents the loss 
function for this case: 
L E Yl [ ( Pt ls EPt ls ) ) + Y2 [ ( p t lA Pt 2B -
stAB) E (Pt lA Pt 2B StAB )) + Ut l 2 
Expansionary monetary policy in country A increases 
Pt lA and St AB more than expected. Higher Pt lA and St AB 
affect the relative price prediction, but the opposite 
direction of the effects offset each other, thereby leaving 
the relative price prediction unchanged. The domestic price 
prediction error is not dependent on change in either of 
these factors. Th e currency of country A relative to that 
of small country depreciates in proportion to the increase 
in the price level in country A . Thus a monetary shock 
under flexible exchange rates is not transmitted to small 
country. 
2. Money Supply Increases In Country B: Money supply 
increases i n country B lead to higher pt2B (good 2 produced 
by country B) and lower S AB t (cou n try B's currency 
de?reciation). The effect of these changes in Pt2B and stAB 
in different loss functions are as follows: 
2. L. Case la: 
Changes 
pr ~ ce prediction error. 
wi : l be affected by 
S AB 
t do not change the domestic 
The relative price prediction error 
these changes , but the opposite 
direction of change in p 2B t relative to 
effects, and there i s not a change in loss. 
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ScAB offsets any 
2. 2. Case lb: Unanticip ate d increases in Pc2B and ScAB 
affect domestic and re l ative price prediction errors. Lower 
than expected StAB increases domestic prices but changes in 
S AB t offset each other, and the relative price 
prediction stays the same. The final result is higher loss 
to the small-country. 
2. 3. Case lc: In t his case the domestic price is again 
not dependent on pt2B or S AB t and opposite direction of 
changes in Pt2B and stAB leave the relative price unchanged . 
Depr ec iation of country B ' s currency relative to the small 
country currency absorbs the increase in prices of country 
B. 
Supply Shock 
A temporary disturbance increasing the output in 
country A or B (a real effect) causes the pric e of good 
(Pc 1 A) or good 2 (Pc2B) to decrease more than expected, but 
the change in the exchange rate (ScAB) is ambiguous. The 
effect of changes in ptlA pt2B and ScAB for different 
cases follow. 
l.Output In Country A Increases: 
l.l.Case la 
fluctuations in 
prediction errors. 
Changes in 
domestic as well as 
and S AB t 
relative 
cause 
price 
Lower ptlA than expected decreases the 
domestic price prediction error, but the change in relative 
4 0 
price predictio n error depends on t h e direction of change in 
If the supply shock in co untry A causes attendi n g 
ScA B to increase (c ountr y A ' s currency depre ciation), then 
the decline in PclA and increase in ScAB also cause a lo wer 
relative price prediction and a larger loss to follow. If 
S AB t decreases, it offsets the fall in p lA t and the final 
effect on relative price , and the loss functio n depends on 
the magnitude of changes i n ptlA and stAB and also 
l 2.Case lb: In this case the effect of changes in Pcl A 
and S AB t on the los s function depend completely on the 
magnitude and direction of c h ange in bo th factors. A larger 
ScAB than expected adds to the lower Pc 1A and lowers both 
the domestic and relative price predi ct ion error s, causing a 
l a rger loss. However, if an increase in suppl y in country A 
lowers ScAB because of its of f setting effe ct , the final 
c hange in loss depends on the new magnitudes of _ptl A 
and y 1 and Y 2. 
S AB t 
1.3.Case lc : Higher output in country A does no t have 
a n y effect on the domesti c price predi c tion in this c ase, 
but causes variation in t h e relative price. High er StAB adds 
to an existing lo wer p l A t and r es ults in higher lo ss. 
However, lower ScAB offsets the lower ptlA and the final 
ef f ect on the loss fun ction i s ambiguous d epending on the 
ma gnit ud e of c hanges in P c l A and stAB. 
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2. Supply Increases In Countr y B: 
2 .1. Case la: Real disturbances in country B cause Pc 2 B 
to fall and an ambiguous c hange in ScAB. The domes t ic price 
prediction error is not affected by this change , but the 
change in relative price depends on the direction of change 
in S AB t . If decreases , the resulting lower 
ScAB cause a larger relative price prediction error and loss 
to the society. Higher StAB than expected offsets the lower 
Pc2B and the final effect depend s on the 
change in Pt2B and StAB . 
magnitude of 
2.2 Case lb: The direction of change in ScAB has an 
important effect on the loss function. If StAB decreases, 
then a higher domestic and relative price prediction error 
results and a large loss is experienced. Howe ver higher 
ScAB offsets lower Pc2B in the relative price prediction 
error and the magnitude of change in pt2B and StAB determine 
the change in relative price prediction. Yl and Y2 also 
affect the final loss result. 
2.3 . Case lc: The domestic price prediction error is not 
dependent on p 2B t or S AB t and changes effect only the 
relative price prediction error . Lower StAB with lower Pc2B 
results in large loss, but higher StAB offsets the change in 
Pc2B and the loss depend s on the relative movements of each 
variable. 
42 
COMPARISON OF THE TRANSMISSION OF DISTURBANCES UNDER 
ALTERNATI VE EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEMS 
The loss functions deri ved indicate that re lative price 
prediction errors are the same under all exchange rate 
characterizations. So exchange rate systems can be compared 
based on movement in the domestic pi:'ice prediction errors 
and by examini ng whether this error offsets or increases the 
relative price predicti on error. 
Monetary disturbances in country A, causing money 
supply to be larger than expected, cause no losses to the 
small country under cases lb (fixed r a tes to B and floating 
rates against A) a nd lc (flexible rates against A and B), 
but result in higher price prediction errors and larger 
losses under case la (fixed rates to A and floating rates 
against B). However, monetary disturbances in countr y B do 
not cause any change in loss to the small country in cases 
la and lc, but lo sses do occur in case lb. Therefore, the 
small country should choose its exchange rate system 
depending on the country in which disturbances originate. 
Pegging to the currency of the country in which the monetary 
disturbances originate does cause a loss to occur in small 
country. However, in the presence of monetary disturbances 
in country A or country B , selection of the flexible 
exchange rate by the small country is preferred in order to 
modify this loss because the disturbances are absorbed 
through depreciation or appreciation of the small country 
43 
currency relative to the large countries ' currencies . Real 
disturbances in the large countries' which increase foreign 
output has transmission effects on the small country . A 
supply shock results in an excess of foreign goods, causing 
their prices to fall and exc hange rates to change 
ambiguously. Supply shocks are therefore responsible for 
short - run deflation abroad. The effects of the occurrence 
of a supply shock on the small country under different 
situations are summar ized in tables I-VI. 
A real disturbance increasing output in country A 
causes p lA t to decrease, but the effect on s AB t is 
ambiguous. If the currency of country A appreciates relative 
to country B's currency, the following cases, shown in 
tab l es I a nd II, ma y occur . 
Case 
la 
lb 
lc 
TABLE I 
REAL DISTURBANCE OCCU RS IN COUN TRY A CAUSING 
LOWER PtlA & StAB and 1 t~ PtlA 1 > 1 6 StAB 
Effect on 
domest i c & rela tive 
price prediction error 
DPPE 
RPPE 
DPPE 
RPPE 
DPPE 
RPPE 
No change 
~ 
Order of Loss -
Effect on 
loss function 
Increase 
In crease 
Increase 
DPPE - Domestic Price Prediction Error 
RPPE - Relative Price Pr edictio n Error 
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Case 
la 
lb 
lc 
TABLE II 
REAL DISTURBANCE OCCURS IN COUNTRY A CAUS I NG 
LOWERPc1A&scABand I li PtlA I< I li ScAB I 
Effect on 
domestic & relative 
price prediction error 
DPPE 
RPPE t 
DPPE 
RPPE 
DPPE No change 
RPPE t 
Order of Los s -
Llb > Llc > Lla 
Effect on 
loss function 
Increas e 
Increas e 
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Occurrence of a real disturbance in country A causes 
its output to increase, price of its product to decrease, 
and its currency to depreciate relative to foreign 
currencies. The effect of a real disturb ance in country A 
0 n the loss function of the small country is shown in table 
III. 
Case 
la 
lb 
lc 
TABLE III 
REAL DISTURBANCE OCCURS IN COUNTRY A CAUSING 
LOWER ptlA & HIGHER StAB 
Effect on 
domestic & relative 
price prediction error 
DPPE 
RPPE 
DPPE 
RPPE 
DPPE No change 
RPPE .f 
Order of Loss 
Effect on 
loss function 
Increase 
Increase 
Increase 
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Occurrence of real disturbances in country B decrease 
p 2B 
t ' but 
th e loss 
the effe ct on S AB t 
function under 
is ambiguous . The effects 
diff erent circumstances 
summarized in tables IV-VI. 
TABLE I V 
THE CURRENCY OF COUNTRY B RELATIVE TO COUNTRY A 
DEPRECIATES, LOWER ScAB THAN EXPECTED 
Case 
la 
lb 
l c 
Effect on 
domestic & relative 
price prediction error 
DPPE No change 
RPPE t 
DPPE 
RPPE 
DPPE No change 
RPPE t 
Order of Loss 
Llb > Lla - Llc 
Effect on 
loss function 
Incre ase 
In crease 
Incre ase 
on 
are 
Case 
l a 
lb 
lc 
TABLE v 
RE AL DISTURB ANCE I N COUNTRY B CAUS I NG LOWER 
pt 2 B & HIGHER StAB THAN EXPE CTED 
AND 1 t. ptZB 1 > 1 t. stAB 1 
Effect on 
domestic & relative 
price pr e di ct ion error 
DPPE No c han ge 
RPPE t 
DPPE 
RPPE 
DPPE No change 
RPPE t 
- Order of Loss -
Ll a - L1 c > Llb 
Effect on 
l oss function 
Increase 
Increase 
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Case 
la 
lb 
lc 
TABLE VI 
REAL DISTURB ANCE IN COUNTRY B CAUSING LOWER 
pt 2 B and HIGHER StAB THAN EXPECTED 
AND I 6 Pt 2 B I < I 6 StAB I 
Effect on 
domestic & relative 
price pr ediction error 
DPPE No change 
RPPE .. 
DPPE .. 
RPPE .. 
DPPE No change 
RPPE .. 
Order of Loss 
Llb > Lla - Llc 
-
Effect on 
loss function 
Increase 
Increase 
Increase 
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so 
Ambiguity in dire ction and magnitude of change in 
exchange rate and prices in the large countries results in 
different effects on the 
different cases previously 
loss function. Of 
discussed , adoption 
the 
of 
six 
the 
flexible exchange rate system is preferred and results in 
the least loss in four of the cases. However , adoption of 
an exchange rate regime depends on the sp ecific 
circumstances, particularly , the source of the disturbances. 
When the small country chooses to fix its exchange rate 
to country A and float against country B, or to fix to 
country B and float against country A, its prices are 
determined exogenously . Price is determined endogenously 
under the flexible exchange rate system. The loss functions 
for the three different options have been derived which 
indicates that the relative price prediction errors are the 
same under all exchange rate setups. Exchange rate systems 
were compared based on domestic price prediction e rror and 
by examining whether domestic price prediction erro r offset 
or expanded relative price prediction error. 
Monetary disturbances in country A, causing the money 
supply to be larger than expected, cause no loss to the 
small country under cases lb and lc, but resulted in higher 
price prediction errors and larger loss under case la ( fi x ed 
rates to A and floating rates against B). Monetary 
disturbances in country B did not cause any change in loss 
to the small cou n try in cases la and lc, but in creased t h e 
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loss in case lb (fixed rates to B and floating rates agai nst 
A). Therefore, the small country sho uld choose its exchange 
rate syste m depending on the country in which disturbances 
originate. Pegging to the currency of the country in which 
the monetar y disturbances originate causes loss to the s mall 
country . In the pres e nce of monetary disturbances in 
country A or countr y B , selection of a flexible exc hange 
rate b y the small country is preferred, since such 
disturbances are absorbed through depreciation or 
appreciation of the small country currency relati v e to the 
large countries currencies . 
Real disturbances in country A or in country B caused 
low er ptlA and pt2B respectively, but the effect on StAB was 
ambiguous. If StAB increases as a result of a suppl y shock 
in country A or decreases because of a suppl y shock in 
country B , adoption of a fle xi ble exchange rate b y the small 
c ountry is preferred . How eve r , if S AB t decreases or 
increases because of the occurrence of real disturances in 
country A or country B, the result is totall y dependen t on 
the magnitude of ch a n ge in ptlA and stAB as well as va lu es 
of Yt and Y z . The order of los s for each case is s h ow n in 
tables I -V I . 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE THREE COUNTRY - THREE GOOD MODEL 
The world is assumed to consist of three . countries and 
three goods. Two of the three countries are assumed to be 
"large" and the third country is "small". Of the three 
goods, one is assumed to be a finished good and the others 
are intermediate goods. Large countries A and B produce 
intermediate goods (goods 2 and 3 respectively ) and the 
small country produces a finished good (good 1 ), using 
imported goods 2 and 3 , and exports to the large countries. 
The small country does not import good 
of the large countries for consumption. 
or good 3 from any 
The countries issue 
their own currency which is not internationally tradable. 
It is assumed that the small country faces foreign real and 
monetary disturbances through the process of importing goods 
2 and 3 for production of domesti c output . 
assumptions are also made: 
The following 
1. Expectations are assumed to be rational . 
2. Perfect capital mobility exists between the two 
large countries (country A and country B), but capital is 
immobile between the smal l country and the large countries. 
3. Goods arbitrage is assumed to be perfect and all 
goods are t rad ed. 
4. The model is assumed to be logarithmically linear in 
all variables except the intere st r ate. 
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5. Each country's economy consists of two markets,i.e . 
the goods market and the money market. 
issues exist. 
No bonds or paper 
THE MODEL 
Notation 
Lower case letters denote logarithms of variables while 
Greek letters represent parameters and they are all assumed 
to be positive. Subscripts refer to the time dimension. 
y Small country-real output 
y* Country A real output 
y** Country B real output 
y Small country-normal (desired) real output 
y* Country A-normal (desired) real output 
y** Country B-normal (desired) real output 
pl s Price of good l in small country 
p 2s Price of good 2 in small country 
p3s Price of good 3 in small country 
plA Price of good l in country A 
p2A Price of good 2 in country A 
p3 A Price of good 3 in country A 
plB Price of good l in country 
p 2 B Price of good 2 in country B 
p3B Price of good in country B 
S t A Small country- currency price of country A-
St B 
sAB 
m 
* m 
** m 
i 
·* 1 
i** 
u 
* u 
** u 
v 
v* 
v** 
E 
t- j E Pt ls 
c* 
currency 
Small country- currency price of coun try B-
currency 
Country A- currency price of country B- curre n cy 
Small country-nominal stock of money balance 
Country A- nominal stock of money balance 
Country B-nominal stock of money balance 
Small country-interest rate 
Country A-interest rate 
Country B-interest rate 
Small country-stochastic disturbance in output 
supply with mean zero and finite variance 6u2 
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Country A-stochastic disturbance in output supply 
with zero and finite variance 6u2 
Country B-stochastic disturbance in output supply 
with zero and finite variance 6u2 
Small countr y- stochastic disturbance in mon ey 
market with zero mean and finite variance 6v2 
Country A-stochastic disturbance in money market 
with zero mean and finite variance 6v2 
Country B-stochastic distu r bance in mone y market 
with zero mean and finite variance 6v2 
Mathematical expectation operator 
Ex pected value of pls at time t , conditional on 
informat ion available at time t-j 
Country A cost-of-living index which contains 
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prices of both goods , (measure d in domestic 
currency), expressed in logarithms, 
c** Country B cost-of-living index which 
contains 
prices of both goods (measured in domestic 
currency) expressed in logarithms , 
e * , o*, >-* Expenditure shares on each commodity for country 
A 
e ** ,O **, A**Expenditure shares on each commodity for country 
B 
Small Country 
l) Yt - Yt + yl (Pt ls 
StA) E (Pt ls - Pt 2A 
s tBl E (Pt lS - Pt 3B -
Yt d - "o + " 1 (me - Pt 2) 
3) mt d Pt - 8 o + 81 y t 
4) 
Country A 
5) Yt * - yl* ( Ct * - ECt * ) 
(Pt lA Ct *)) * + Ut 
6) Yt d* 
-
a * + " l * ( Pt 2A -0 
7) d* 
- Ct * - 8 o* + 8 l*yt* mt 
+ 
p 
-
y 2 * ( ( 
( ( p ls t 
(Goods supply) 
(Goods demand) 
(Money demand) 
(Money supply) 
Pt lA - Cc*l - E 
(Goods supply) 
tlA) +" 2*yt* 
(Goods demand) 
8 2 *· * (Money demand) lt 
8 ) 
9) c* -
Country B 
10) Yt ** 
-
y l ** (Ct ** - E 
Cc**) E (Pc 3B Ct ** 
ll ) Yt * * - (l ** + (l l ** 0 
12 ) ** Ct ** - so** me 
13) 
14) 
Ct ** 
) ) + 
(Pc lB 
(Money suppl y) 
SeA ) + >, * (Pc3B + StAB ) 
(Cost-of-living Index ) 
) + y 2 "'* ( ( Pc 2B 
** (Goods supply ) Ut 
- Pc 3B ) + (1 2 ** Yt ** 
( Goods demand ) 
+ 81**yc** 82 ** it ** 
(Money demand) 
(Money supply ) 
ScB) + >. ** (Pc2A -StAB) 
(Cost of living Index) 
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Equation (l) is the supply function. Current output, 
e x pressed in terms of its deviation from the normal level Y, 
is a function of domestic price prediction error and 
relative price prediction errors, and uc is a stochastic 
disturbance term having zero mean and constant variance. 
Supply is a positive function of the price of finished goods 
(produced by the small country), P lS t • and is a negative 
function of input prices, p 3B t • (produced by 
country A and country B). Equations (l) and (2) are 
dependent on the underlying production function in the small 
country and have important implications for how effectivel y 
variou s exchange rate regimes insulate domestic output from 
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unanticipated disturbances. 
Equation (2) represents the demand for the domestic 
good which is assumed to depend positively on real money 
balances, domestic income, and foreign countries' income. 
Equations (3), (7), and (12) state the demand for real money 
b y residents of the domestic country and are assumed to be 
dependent on real output positively and nominal interest 
rate negatively. 
Equation (4) specifies the money suppl y process in the 
small country when it elects to adopt flexible exchange 
rates. Equations (8) and (13) represent the money supply 
for country A and country B respectively . Equations (9) and 
(14) define the cost-of-living index which contains the 
prices 
e*, 6* 
of both goods 
A* and, 8 **, 
in terms of domestic currency, where 
6 ** , A** are the expenditure shares 
on each good for country A and country B resp ectively. 
Equation (5) represents the supply function of 
country A. Supply is a function of the cost·-of-living 
prediction errors, and domestic real price prediction errors 
and a stochastic disturbance term (ut*l . Equation ( 10) is 
similar. Equations (6) and (11) are demands for goods and 
are positively related to national income and relative 
prices. As in the three country-two good model, the 
interest rate parity relation (perfect capital mobility 
between two large countries) and purchasing power parity 
relation (law of one price) exist. 
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The loss function i s u s ed as the criterion for 
comparing different exchange rate regimes. 
(15) 
In order t o derive the loss function for the small 
countr y in the form specified by (15), the supply function 
(1) is used as, 
Subtract normal output, Y, from both sides and square the 
expectation of both sides of the equation to get the 
following: 
The left side of the above equation is the same as the right 
side of equation (15). Therefore , the following relation is 
representative of the loss function : 
( 16) 
gtA)- E ( ptlS _ pt2A _ gtA )) + y 3 (( ptlS 
pt3B- StB) - E (Pt l S - pt3B - StB)) + ut J 2 
The above loss function is dependent on domestic and 
foreign prices, ptlS pt2A , pt3B , and the exchange rates 
between the small countr y and the two large countries . The 
loss function is affected by domestic as well as foreign 
random disturbances occuring in the large countries . 
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Again the social objective of the small country is to 
minimize loss. In the following pages the effect of 
external disturbances on the loss function under alternative 
exchange rate regimes will be examined, the results will be 
compared, and a l ternative regimes ranked according to their 
insulative properties. 
MONETARY SHOCK 
Unexpected monetary expansion in country A or B 
depreciates its currenc y relative to the small country's and 
causes the prices of good 2 (produced by country A) good 3 
(produced b~ cou n try B) to exceed expectatio n s. 
l.Case 1: 
The small country pegs its currency to country A ' s and 
floats against country B's currency. The exchange rate 
between the small country and country A is fixed , and 
expansionary monetary policy in country A causes higher 
p 2A 
t ' which lowers the relative price prediction error and 
loss to the society . 
. Case 2: 
The small country pegs its currency to country B ' s and 
floats against country A's currency. In this case, StB is 
fixed and monetary disturbance in country B does not affect 
the exchange rate but increases the price of good more 
than expected, which results in lower rel ative price 
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prediction error and higher loss . 
. Case 3: 
Currency of the small country floats against both large 
countries' currencies. Monetary expansion in country A or 
in country B causes higher prices and a lower exchange rate 
than expected. This expans ion is not transmitted to the 
small country in this case because higher prices in the 
large countries will be absorbed by the exchange rates. 
Assuming a rationa l expectations world and the purchasing 
power parity theory, change in p 2A t is equal to change in 
StA, and when the money supply increases in country B , the 
change in p 3B t is equal to change Relation (16) 
s h ows that an increase in Pt2A is offset by decr ease in StA, 
and an increase in Pc3B is offset by a decrease in ScB; 
therefore monetary expansio n doe s not affect the loss 
function. 
SUPPLY SHOCK 
A temporary disturbance increasing the output in 
country A or B (a real effect) causes the price of good 
(Pt3B) to decrease more than expect ed , but 
the change in the exchange rates (StA StB ) is ambiguous. 
Different cases are developed in the following pages: 
l. Output Increases in Country A 
Higher output than expected results in a lower price 
for good 2, Pt 2A +, but the exchange rate of country A 
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relati v e to the small country ma y appreciate or depreciate. 
If the large country's currency appreciates, StA t , adoption 
of flexible exchange rates or pegging to country B is 
preferred because decreases in pt2A offset the . increases in 
stA• and selection of pegging to country A's currency causes 
a higher loss. In the case of the large country's currency 
depreciation case l peg to country A and float 
against country B) is preferred to modify the loss. Under 
cases 2 and 3 the small country experiences higher loss. 
2. Output Increases in Country B: 
Higher output causes lower prices 
ambiguous changes in the exchange rate. 
for p 3B t and 
The result is 
simi l ar to the case when output increases in country A. 
Depreciation of country B ' s currency stB t, as a result of 
this real effect, makes case 2 (peg to country B' s currency 
and float against country A's currency) the preferred 
choice. However, appreciation of country B's currency, stB• 
changes the result and makes case 2 the least preferred 
choice . The other two choices (cases 1 and 3) cause loss to 
the small country. 
In this model again the similar results to those of 
chapter III are reached. The small country could insulate 
itself against the country in which the monetary 
disturbances originate , because the exchange rate change 
absorbs external nominal disturbances. Howe v er , occurrence 
of real disturbances create different situations and its 
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CHAPTER V 
THE TWO COUNTRY - TWO GOOD MODEL 
An open economy model of a small country that faces 
real and monetary disturbances from a large country (assumed 
to be rest of the world) is developed. There are two goods, 
one is assumed to be a finished good (good l) and the other 
is an intermediate good (good 2). The small country imports 
good 2 from the large country to produce good l and exports 
it to the large country. Goods arbitrage is assumed to be 
perfect, 
country 
and all 
imports 
goods 
good 
are 
2 
traded, except that 
only for production. 
expectations are assumed to be rational. 
THE MODEL 
Notation 
the small 
Again 
Lower case letters denote logarithms of variables for 
the small country while an asterisk indicates the large 
country. Greek letters represent parameters and they are all 
assumed to be positive. Subscripts refer to the time 
dimension. 
Y Real output 
Y Normal (desired) output 
pl Price of good l 
p2 Price of good 2 
St Small country-currency price of large country-currency 
m Nominal stock of money balance 
i 
u 
v 
E 
Et- j Pt 1 
c 
e . 1- e 
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Interest rate 
Stochastic di st urbanc e in output supply wi th mean 
zero and finit e variance 0 2 u 
Stochastic disturbance in mone y mar ket with ze r o 
mean and finite variance 0 2 v 
Mathematical expectation operator 
Expected value of pl at time t, cond itional on 
information a v ailable at time t-j 
The cost of living inde x which cont ai n s prices of 
both goods , ( measured in domestic currency), 
expressed in logarithms 
Expenditur e shares on each commodity 
Small Country 
(l) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
(4) 
y t - y t + Y1 ( P t l 
E( Pcl_ pt2 * Sc)l+ut 
Pt 1 l + a2yt 
Bo + B 1 Y t 
Large Country 
y t * - yl * ( c t * 
p 2* 
t 
(Goods Supply) 
(Goods demand) 
(Money d emand) 
(Mo n ey Supply) 
(Goods supply) 
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( 7) d* Ct * - 8 * + 81 * Yt * ~ * Et (Ct+l * * ) mt - 0 2 Ct 
( Mone y dem and) 
( 8) * * + vt * (Money suppl y) mt mt-1 
( 9) Ct * a* Pt 2* + ( 1 a *l < Pt 1 s tl 
(Cost-of-living Index) 
Equation (1). is the supply function. Current output, 
expressed in terms of its deviation from the normal level , 
Y, is a function of domestic price prediction error and 
relative price prediction error , and Ut is a stochastic 
disturbance term having zero mean and constant variance. 
Equation (2) represents the demand for the domestic 
good which is assumed to depend positively on real money 
balance of domestic and foreign income. Equations (3) and 
(7) state the demand for real money by residents of the 
small and the large countries and are assumed to be 
dependent on real output positively and nominal interest 
rate negatively. 
Equation (4) specifies the money suppl y process in the 
small country when it elects to adopt flexible exchange 
rates . Equation (8) represent the money supply for the 
large country. 
Equation (5) represents the supply function of the 
lartge country A . Supply is a function of the cost-of-
living prediction errors and domestic real price predi ct ion 
errors and a stochastic disturbance term ( ut* l . Equation 
(6) is demand for goods and is positively related to 
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national income and relative prices. Equation (9 ) defines 
the cost-of-liv ing index which contains the prices of both 
goods in terms of domestic currency , where 0 and (1-0 ) ar e 
the expend iture shares on each good. 
There is a link b etween the small and t h e large 
countries purchas in g power parity. 
( 10) 
Equation ( 10 ) is the purchasing power parity relation 
and it states that the logarithm of domestic price is equal 
to the logarithm of foreign price plus (minus) the logarithm 
of exchange rate. 
Again, a quadrati c lo ss function which provides a 
measure of the los s is used , 
(11) 
The supply function for the small country, (1), is used 
to derive the loss function in the form specified by (11), 
following the same process as for the three country-three 
good model, the loss function is: 
(12) L - E [(Yt 
P t 2 * - st ) 
The above loss function is d e p endent on domestic error 
in predicting the pri ces of good 1 and good 2 in the small 
country . In the following pages the effects of various 
disturbances originating in the large countr y are e x amined. 
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MONETARY SHOCK 
Expansionary monetary policy in the large country 
depreciates its currenc y relative to the small country's 
currency, St and causes the price of ' good to increase 
more than expected. In a rational expectations world and 
with the existence of the purchasing power parity theory, 
the change in Pt2* is equal to the change in St. If the 
small country adopts a flexible exchange rate system 
inflation in the large country is absorbed through currency 
depreciation and is not transmitted to the small country. 
Selection of a fixed exchange rate regime (the small country 
pegs its currency to the large country), fixed St, causes 
higher relative price prediction error and loss to the small 
countr y . 
SUPPLY SHOCK 
Occurrence of real disturbances in the large country 
cause lower prices for good 2 than expected, Pt2* but the 
effect on the exchange rate, St, is ambiguous. Adoption of 
flexible exchange rate system by the small country and 
appreciation of the large country's currency, Sc offsets 
the effect of lower pt2* and results in less loss, however, 
depreciation of 
lower Pt 2 * and 
the currency, St expands 
the small country experiences 
the effect of 
a high e r loss. 
With a fixed exchange rate (the small countr y pegs its 
currency to the · larg e country), St is fixed and the i.oss to 
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the s mall count r y is equal to the cha n ge in pt2* and is not 
affected b y ap pre ciation or depreciation of th e currency. 
Similar conclusions as for other previous cases are 
reached. Nomina l disturbances are not t r ansmitted to the 
I 
sma ll co untr y under a fl ex ible exchange ra te system , but 
they do ca u se loss under other systems. Rea l disturbances 
cause more lo sses under fixed than flexible exchange rate 
systems if they cause the large count r y 's currency to 
appreciate, If real disturbances result in 
depreciation of th e larg e country's currency, a d option of a 
fix ed exchange rate system is preferr e d . 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONC LUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
CONCLUSION 
This study has focused on the· cho ice of exchange rate 
r egi mes for a small country when external real and monetary 
disturbances occur. The choice of exchange rate was 
investigated using a loss function expressing the squared 
deviations of the small country output from desired output. 
To examine the transmission of economic disturbances, the 
loss function for the small country's economy was calculated 
under three different exchange rate regimes for each of the 
three models . The em ph asis of the ana lysi s was on a three-
countr y (one sma ll and two large) trading situation, whereby 
the sma ll country trades with two major large country 
trading partners. In the first model, the small country 
import s an intermediate good from one of the large countries 
and produces a finished good to export. The same finished 
good is produced by one other large country. In the second 
model both large countries produce intermediate goods which 
are imported by the small country to produce a finished good 
wh i ch is exported to the large countries. The analysis 
incorporated rational expectations as well as 
capital mobility between the two large countries. 
perfect 
It is 
assumed throughout that there is perfect commodity arbitrage 
between two large countries. A third model analyzed the 
impact of exchange rate regime on the small countr y in a 
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world co n s isting of only two co un tr i es (one small and one 
large ) The small countr y imports an intermediate good from 
the large countr y to produce a finished goo d and exports it 
to the large country. The small count r y does not import 
goods for consumption and it is assumed throughou t t h at 
trade is necessar y for production . 
Independent floating is often considered infeasible by 
developing countries be cause of underdevelopment of domestic 
finan c ial markets. Ho wever, ruling out some form of ''clean'' 
or "managed" floating does not remove the possibili ty of 
adopting other types of flexible exchange rate a rr angements . 
Hence, in this study the flexible exc h a n ge rate system is 
found to generally be the superior choice for the small 
country under the assumpsions of the mod el. 
As writers in the 1950s and 1960s predicted a nd this 
analysis confirms, under the flexible exchange rat e system, 
o cc urrence of purel y nominal shocks abroad a re not 
transmitted to the s mall country. Expansionary mon etary 
polic y of large country trading partners increas es prices. 
mor e t han expected . Increasing the money supply a l so 
results in depreciation of the l a rg~ c ountr y 's currency 
relative to the small country's in proportion to the 
increase in the price leve l . Exch a ng e rate changes ful l y 
offset any nominal disturbances. Ho weve r, n om in al 
dist urbances occurin g in th e l arge country do affect the 
smal l country when the small countr y p egs its currency to 
71 
t he currency of th e country in which nominal disturbances 
originate. 
The presence of real disturbances in larg e count ries 
induces lower prices for the goods they produ ce, but the 
effect on the exchange rate is ambiguous. Ambiguity in 
direction and magnitude of change in exchange rate, as well 
as undetermined magnitude of change in a larg e country's 
prices, results in different effects on the loss function 
assumed in this study. In the three countr y -two good 
situation, if lower pri c es in the large coun tr ie s a r e 
acco mp anied by depreci ation of the currency of the country 
in which real disturban ces occur, adoptio n of a flexible 
exchange rate is preferred. However, appreciation of the 
large countries' currencies results in four different cases. 
In the case of a supply shock in, say, countr y A (a large 
country), if change in p lA t ( price of good 1 in country A) 
is greater than change in ScAB (appreciation of country A ' s 
currency relative to country B' s currency), selection of a 
flexible exchange rate regime is advised, otherwise it is 
better to peg to country A's currency . The oc c urrence of 
sup pl y s hock in country B causing greater chang e in StAB 
t han in Pt 2 B (price of good 2 in country B) results in lower 
losses to the small country under case lc (a strategy to 
float against two large countri es). P egg ing to country B's 
c urrenc y is preferred when a real shock in country B results 
in greater change in p 2B t than in S AB t . This a n alys is 
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indicates in general that adoption of a fl exible exchange 
rate syste m by a small country results in lower lo s s in most 
cases if the small country faces external disturbances. 
Th e analys is concludes that the cho ic e of an exchange 
rate system is a very delicate d ecisio n. A theoretical 
cons ideration of different exchange rate regimes indicates 
t hat an optimal choice of regime should depend upon specific 
conditions an d paramet er va lue s. The United States , Japan, 
an d Korea, or the United States, Japan, and Taiwan a re 
examp l es of three-country tradi n g situations. The United 
States a nd Japan are large coun tries and Korea and Taiwan 
co uld be co nsidered small countries which trade with these 
large nations. The currency of the U.S. and Japa n are 
indep en dentl y floating and selection of an exchange rate 
regime for Korea or Taiwan is open to choice . The new 
Taiwan dollar has been continuously pegged to the U.S. 
dollar, though histori ca ll y with many changes . Nominal and 
real di sturbances originat ing in the U.S. affect Taiwan even 
with the adjusting peg system that has been implemented. 
Taiwan gains or loses its co mpe titiveness against another 
country (Japan) when the dollar depreciates or appreciates 
respectively. Appreciation or d e p reciatio n of its currency 
is not really the result of the balance of payment 
situation. Taiwan has a large surplus and its economy is 
affected by changes in the U.S . economy. Korea is using a 
managed floating (c r awling peg) system and attempts to 
7 3 
stabilize its currency with respect to changes in the U .S. 
dollar. 
According to this study , these are not the appropriate 
reg ime choices and other thing being equal, c ould result in 
losses to these count ries. The analysis ind icates that in 
most cases the fle xible exchang e rate regime is preferred 
a nd adoption of the flexible regime would modify the effect 
of real and monetar y disturbances occuring in the large 
countries which are trading partners with these less 
developed nations. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE EMPIRICAL STUD IES 
Thi s study has provided theoretical direction for 
maki ng choices regarding exc h a ng e rate policy in a s mall, or 
less-developed country. Empirical work would involve 
deriving the magnitud e of the loss function for many 
different trading situations of interest. For example, 
there are many issues of exchang e rate, trade, and growth in 
the European-African trade situation, the Near East trading 
patterns, and the Pacific Rim trading conditions, but these 
tra ding situations and t h e choices of exchange rates which 
are associated with them are beyond the scope of this st udy. 
However, a projection of work that could be done to extend 
the theoretical directions of this study can be briefly 
outli ned . 
In the preceding chapters loss fun ctions under 
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different assumptions for a small country were derived and 
the effects of external nominal and real disturb ances were 
examined qualitativel y. Empirical determination of the loss 
functions and their fluctuations, involving estimation of 
domestic and foreign price and exchange r~te solutions, need 
to be carried out. The three country- two good model is an 
example of empirical work that can be done. Other models 
follow a similar pattern. This study analyzed the 
theoretical direction of three-country models. Future 
empirical work could involve a look at man y different 
representative cases in order to completely describe trading 
regimes and the insulation policies that would be involved 
using the forego i ng theoretical direction. 
Determination of values for prices and exchange rates 
clearing conditions for the mone y and goods requires 
markets. The assumption that expectat ions are rational 
implies that prices and exchange rates (an d other endogenous 
variables) are formulated using all available information at 
a particular time. The following are postulated solution 
forms for each of the endogenous variables in terms of 
exogenous variables. 
exogenous variables. 
The solution is log linear in the 
1) Pt lS - Tr llffit-1 + Tr l2 * + Tr l3 ** + Trl4 vt + mt-1 mt-1 
Tr lsvt * + Tr l6 vt ** + Tr l7 + Tr 18 * + Tr 19 ** Ut Ut Ut 
2) Pt lA - Tr 21 + Tr 2 2 * + Tr 2 3 ** + Tr 24 vt + mt-1 ffit - 1 mt-1 
n 2 5 vt * + "26 Vt ** + Tr 2 7 + Tr 28 * + Tr 2 9 ** Ut Ut Ut 
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3 ) Pt 2B TT 31 + TT 32 * + TT 33 ** + TT 34 vt + mt-1 mt-1 mt-1 
TT 3 5 vt * + TT 3 6 Vt ** + TT 3 7 + TT 38 * + TT 39 ** Ut Ut Ut 
4) St AB TT 41 + TT 42 * + TT 43 1** + TT 44 vt + mt-1 mt-1 mt-
n 4 5 Vt * + TT 46 Vt ** + TT 47 + TT 48 * + TT 49 * * Ut Ut Ut 
B * 
i 
** 5) St - TTS l mt -1 + TIS 2 mt-1 + TT S3 mt-1 + TT54 Vt + 
n ss Vt * + TT 56 Vt ** + TT 57 + n58 * + TT 59 ** Ut Ut Ut 
6) Yt * - TT 61 + TT62 * + TT6 3 ** + TT 64 vt + mt-1 mt-1 mt-1 
The above solut i ons are samples and the solution for the 
other endogenous variables: i. i * i**, Y, y**, m, * m ' 
and m** should be found in terms of exogenous variables . 
The form used in the above solutions is based on the 
assumption that the small country adopts a flexible exchange 
rate system. If the small country pegs its currency to the 
currency of a large country the form for the small country 's 
endogenous variables is different. For example, ptlS (price 
of good 1 in small country) is, 
7) 
TT * 18 Ut + 
Where rt-1 is the foreign reserve and dt-1 is the domestic 
credit in the last period. 
Finding solutions for the model requires determining 
values for each of the reduced form coefficients TT ij ) . 
This could be done by substituting the postulated solutions 
for each endogenous variable, in terms of the exog e nous 
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variables, into the demand and s upply equation s of the 
model. The interest rate parity and purchasin g power parit y 
relations could be used to extend the equation syste m a nd to 
find unknowns 
eq u ation for country A . 
8) 
For example, write the supply 
p 2B 
t 
Then substitute the postulated solutions for each of the 
endogenous variables. To find Cc* (Cost -of-li v ing index for 
country A): 
Cc * - e * PclA + e* 
+ n 39 uc* * + n 51 me -l+ n 52mc-1* + n 53 mc-1 ** + n 54 Vc + 
n 55 Vc* + n 56 Vc** + n57ut + n 58 uc* . + n 59 uc** ) 
Simplifying the above relation would result in , 
9) Cc * 
-
e* [ ( n21 - n 31 n51) me-l + n 22 n 3 2 n 52) 
me-l * + ( n 23 n3 3 n 53) ** + n24 n 34 n 54) me-l 
Vc + <n 25 n 35 - n 55) Vc * + ( n 26 n n56) Vc** + ( 36 
n 2 7 n 3 7 n5 7) + ( n 28 n 3 8 n 58) * + <n 29-Ut Ut 
n 3g n 59) uc**l + n + n 51) + ( n + n 52) 3 1 me -l 32 
* + n 3 3 + n 53) me- 1 me-l ** + n 34 + n 5 4 ) Vc + ( 
n3 5 + " 55 ( V t * + 
+ ( 
The rationa l expectation assumption requires that the 
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expectation of a variab le is its expected value conditioned 
on available information. The expectation at time t-1 of 
the domestic price to prevail at time t is determined 
accordi ng to: 
Once the excess supply equation is expressed only in terms 
of exogenous variables, the coefficients of each exogenous 
variable are constrained to be zero. 
The unexpected part of the cost-of-living index and 
relative price prediction error are determined as: 
10) Gt * E Gt * - 6 * [ ( " 24 "34 "s 4) Vt + ( "2 s " 35 
"s s) Vt * + ( " 26 "36 1T 56) vt ** + ( " 27 " 37 
1T57) + ( "2 a "3 a "sa) * + ( "29 1T 3 9 1T 59) Ut Ut 
ut**J + ( 1T 34 + " s4) Vt + (" 3 5 1T 55) vt * + ( 1T 3 6 + 
n 56) vt** + ("37 + 11 57) ut + ( 11 3a + "sa) ut * + ( " 39 
+ " sg) ut** 
11) (Pt lS Pt 2B S tB) E (Pt lS Pt 2B S tB) - ( " 14-
n34 1T 54) vt + " 15 "35 " ss) vt * +( " 16 "36 
1T56) vt** + ( " 17 11 37 1T 57) Ut + ( 11 la " 38 "sa) 
* + ( 11 1 9 11 39 - "s g) ** Ut Ut 
substitute equations (10) and ( 11) into ( 8) ' 
12) 1161 mt-1 + " 62 * + 1T 6 3 ** + "64 Vt + " 65 v * ffit-1 mt-1 t 
+ 1T 66 Vt ** + " 6 7 + " 6a * + 11 69 ** - y l * { 3* [ ( Ut Ut Ut 
" 24 " 34 " s4) Vt + <"2s 1135 1T 55) vt * + <"26 
" 36 " s 6) vt ** + "27 - 1T 3 7- " s7) Ut + ( 1T 2 a " 3a-
n Sa) * + <"29 " 39 " sg) uc**l + ( 1T 34 + "s4) Vt+ Ut 
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" 3s + " ss) vt* + ( " 36 + " 56) vt** + < " 37 + " s7> ut +( 
1T5 4) Vt + " l s- rr 35 - 1T 55) vt * + ( " 16 1T 3 6 
v t ** + ("17 1T 3 7 - " 57> + ( " 18 1T 3 8 1T 58) * Ut Ut 
1T lg 
" 39 1T 59) Ut**) + Ut - 0 
Si mpl ify equati on (12) to get, 
" 61 ffit-1 + 1[ 62 * ffi t-1 + 1T 6 3 ** + 1T 64 - y l *o* ( ffit-1 
1T 24 1T34 " 54 ) Y2 * ( 1T 1.4 " 34 1T 54) J vt + [ 
1T 6 5 - Y1*e* ( 1l 2 5 - 1T " ss > y 2 * (" 15 - 1T 3 5 -35 
" 55) J vt * + [ 1T 66 - yl *6 * ( " 26 " 3 6 - "s6> - y 2 * ( 
" 1 6 " 36 - 1T 56) J Vt ** + [" 6 7 Yl * e * ( " 27 - 1T 3 7 
TT 5 7) 
- Y2 * ( " 17 1T 3 7 " s1> + 1 J Ut + [ 1T 68 
n * e * 1T 2 8 1T "s a) y 2 * 1T 1T 1T 58) J 38 18 38 
* + 
" 69 - Y 1 *e * TT2 9 " 39 "Sg) - y2 * Ut -
( 1T 19 " 39 - 1T 59) J ** - 0 Ut 
The coeffic ient s of each variable could be constrained 
to ze ro . Equating the coefficients of the nine exogenous 
variables in the countr y A supply equat ion to zero yie lds 9 
c onstraints on the ij variables. 
" 61 - 0 
" 62 
-
0 
" 63 - 0 
"64 Yl * e * "2 4 1T 34 '1T 54) y 2 * ( " 1 4 ' 34 - 1T 54) - 0 
TT65 Y1*e* " 25 1T 3 5 " ss > y 2 * ( " 1 5 ' 35 - " ss> - 0 
"66 Yl* e* "26 1T 36 " s6 > y 2 * ( " 16 ' 36 n 56> - 0 
TT6 7- Y1 *e * ( " 2 7 - " 37 1T 57)- Y2*( " 1 7 1T 3 7 - 1T 57) + 1- 0 
n 68 
n 69 
Yl *e * 
Y1 *e * 
n28 _ n 38 · n 58) 
n39- n s9 ) 
y * 2 
y * 2 
n l8 n 38 
n l9 n 3 9 
7 9 
n 5 8 ) - 0 
ns9)- 0 
Imposing the same procedure on the rest of the model 
yields other equations used to determine the reduced form 
coefficients ( rr ij 's). 
The values of the reduced form coefficients in the 
postulated solutions are functions of the parameters of the 
goods and money markets of the small as well as the large 
countries. The output supply values can be outlined from 
the parameters of the production functions of the small and 
the two large countries. The production function param ete rs 
could be estimated . Assuming the Cobb -Dougl as production 
function, for example, the production elasticities are the 
shares of each input and perhaps could be obtained from 
secondary data. For the small country the two inputs could 
be labor and imports. 
One then needs to estimate expenditures on goods . The 
expenditures in the small country depend on real balances 
and domestic income. The large countries ' expenditure 
functions depend on relative price and in come; therefore 
data on GNP, real balance, and prices gives the info rm a tion 
needed to estimate the parameters. The demand for real 
balance in the small country is 
a nd s0 81 and B2 in the small and similar par a me t e r s in 
t he large countries should be estimated. 
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Once the structural coefficients have been estimated 
for these relationships, the reduced form coefficient s can 
be determined and they can be used to examine the loss 
function as impacted b y the occurrence of nominal and real 
disturbances origina ting abroad . 
Other research that could be done by empirical work 
beyond the scope of this study, involve the analysis of 
effects of fluctuations in real income and output price in 
one large country on the economy of another large-country 
trading partner. If , for example, the elasticities of 
demand for goods of a particular large country with respect 
to relative price and real income of another large country 
trading p a rtner are small co mpared t o the same e l asticities 
obtai n ed by reversing the large country of interest, then 
trade deficit patt erns ma y be explained. It may be that 
fluctuations in relat ive price and real income in the U.S., 
for example, do impact the economy, but the converse impact 
is weak . Hence a partial explanation of the huge trade 
deficit in the U.S. could be derived. 
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